

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Report of the Military Advisory Panel Meeting, 12-13 March 1987

FROM:

PO/NIC

EXTENSION

NO.

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DATE

23 March 1987

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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see notes

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20 March 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Amb. Seymour Weiss  
Chairman, Military Advisory PanelSUBJECT: Report of Military Advisory Panel (MAP)  
Meetings of 12-13 March 1987

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See my notes  
Brisson. appropriate  
Comments of MAP  
(and me) to NIOS.  
Have each respond back to  
me on the above.*

1. Introduction. At attachment A is the agenda for the above subject meetings. The paragraphs which follow provide our detailed comments. Two general points which applied to several estimates warrant calling to your attention:

- As we have had reason to note in earlier communications, there is a tendency to treat estimates in what sometimes appears to be "splendid isolation." That is to say, in answering a specific tasking it is implicitly assumed the policymaker has read and has retained in his mind other estimates which are relevant. Probably both assumptions are wrong. The MAP does not expect nor recommend that each estimate repeat all other relevant estimates but surely it is not too much to ask the drafters to make brief references or even to cross-reference key judgments to be found in other relevant estimates.
- For our taste, the estimates are still all too frequently lacking in a politico-military context. This is especially relevant when attempting to assess the "why" behind Soviet motivations. Examples will be specified below.

*I understand  
you.*

You recall that we proposed some time ago that individual estimates be placed into logical groupings. (See our memorandum to you of 11 August 1986.) If this approach, which you found attractive, were to be followed the above concerns might be alleviated.

2. Follow-Up to Meeting of December 11-12. The Panel was pleased to learn that you had requested follow-up work on a number of issues raised by the MAP. The Panel met with General Horton and the NIO's and received a status report on the reactions to our proposals and your taskings. A word about our purpose. The Panel has no interest in a continuing monitoring of

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our past proposals. However, when the MAP was commissioned we were enjoined, among other things, to attempt to alert the DCI to issues which could, in one way or another, blind-side him. Having offered views and made recommendations, which you in turn tasked Agency personnel to address, we believed it useful to gain an impression as to what if anything resulted. Our impressions are these:

o Post-Reykjavik.

- The MAP's view that focus on the zero ballistic missile option was a mistake and that the Intelligence Community could provide a useful service in saying so has not, so far as we could discern, been accommodated. This does not mean the NIO disagrees with the substantive judgment. Rather, in "answering the mail" the focus was on the zero option. We recognize, of course, that the government as a whole has tended to move away from this option and toward the 50% reduction, still the Agency, if it has not already done so, ought to find an appropriate time to state its judgment on the likelihood (not to mention consequences) of the zero option materializing.
- Conversely our suggestion that an historical record of previous Soviet arms control proposals should be developed apparently has been accepted ("apparently" only because we haven't had the time to read it or see how much prominence it was accorded).
- The extent to which our view that the Reykjavik proposals of the Soviets needed to be put in a political context in order to be clearly assessed, was a matter on which we remained unclear based on our meetings, until we met in Executive Session with you. The Panel pressed for attention being directed to the Soviet game plan vis-a-vis the US, NATO, strategic stability, etc. Whether or not there has been a fundamental change in Soviet political objectives or conversely whether the Soviets believe acceptance of any of the proposals on the table, including the delinked INF, advance traditional Soviet expansionist objectives seemed to us relevant. These are the sorts of questions which the MAP believes at least some senior US officials seem unclear about. Based on your briefing of the papers you sent forward on March 13 it sounded as if you had independently reached a similar conclusion. The MAP applauds your effort. (Indeed we could have saved a good deal of time in our meetings had we been aware of it at the outset.)
- Finally, the NSDD 250 requirement for a joint ACDA/CIA verification assessment, which we reported lagging in December, has apparently made little progress. Given the critical importance of the verification issue--to the zero

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option, the 50% option and the INF proposal--this seems to us a serious deficiency. Once again, we gather that you have, in one fashion or another, touched on this issue in your March 13 comments. Still one wonders why the CIA/ACDA bureaucracy was not more rapidly responsive and whether you were kept informed of progress, or lack thereof.

Depending upon the precise nature of your March 13 comments (which the MAP did not see) and your sense of the response thereto, the MAP suggests the following for your consideration: Whatever seemed appropriate in response to NSDD 250, there is now a new team in place in the White House. Issues concerning what Soviet motivations are (the political context mentioned above), clarification of the verification issues (and beyond verification what the Soviets may have learned about US unwillingness to enforce compliance in the face of Presidential charges of Soviet cheating) and similar major issues may warrant a special intelligence assessment from the DCI. We doubt a coordinated IC product can be quickly produced and time may be of the essence. However he comes out, the DCI should be on record and in sufficient detail on the key issues before a decision is made to enter into another arms control agreement.

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this is good*

- o Nth Country Nuclear Delivery Capabilities. The MAP was pleased that its recommendations were positively received by the NIO. (One substantive point which may warrant attention it is not now receiving: the Estimate focuses on regional Nth country concerns

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- o Soviet Submarine Trends. The MAP was pleased that you adopted our suggestion of a covering letter.
- o Deep Underground Facilities. The MAP was informed that the briefing is being updated. Whether the updated briefing emphasizes the policy implications of the Soviet action (what the NIO properly typified as the "so what" question) we do not know since we haven't had the updated brief. Presumably you will wish to satisfy yourself on this point before the briefing is given to the Special Assistant to the President, to the Secretary of State and to the President himself. The MAP, either collectively or individually, would be prepared to hear the revised briefing before it is given to policy people to offer our judgments on its responsiveness to concerns appropriate for policymakers.
- o Hanoi and POW's. Again the MAP suggestions were fully adopted by the NIO who found them especially useful since the estimate is in an early stage.

*NIO/SP -  
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3. **Soviet Chemical Warfare Agent Production.** The panel was briefed on a draft IIM on production of Soviet chemical warfare agents. There apparently are other CW estimates dealing with Soviet doctrine for use, arms control verification, etc., the main features of which were not reflected in this estimate on production. This was the first of several estimates briefed to the Panel wherein a very narrow frame of reference, however responsive to answering the literal request placed on the IC, could result in misleading the policymakers. This IIM was undertaken at the request of the Chairman, Interdepartmental Group, Chemical and Biological Warfare and the Department of State. The IIM concept paper states that the "Memorandum will provide a current assessment of the Soviet chemical warfare agent production capability and will support requirements of the US Delegation to the CW Conference on Disarmament."

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The Panel is concerned that the paper as presently drafted in its narrow content could be improperly interpreted or used by the policymakers or arms control community. We therefore suggest that the paper should be revised to take a step beyond the original tasking to provide a more complete and balanced intelligence assessment of the question of chemical weapon production and potentially a ban on such weapons (and indeed it is our impression that other estimates already completed or presently planned are likely to address these issues). It is suggested you revise the draft to make the following points:

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4. Sino-Soviet Relations. In the wake of our discussions with the NIOs on the Soviet Union and China, we are impressed that the time is most certainly ripe for the prompt preparation of an estimate, NIE 13-22-87, on "Whither Sino-Soviet Relations." The concept paper and terms of reference we reviewed indicate that the NIOs plan to undertake a detailed examination of recent developments in the policies of Moscow and Beijing vis-a-vis one another and to make reasoned projections about the likely course of their relations over the next few years. There are two elements of the situation which we believe should be given particular attention. First, it will be important to explore the relevant broader domestic and foreign policy contexts in both the Soviet Union and China that bear on this relationship. What key considerations do the leadership groups in Moscow and Beijing have to take into account and what do they have to gain or lose in pursuing a rapprochement with the other? What are the longer term prospects for Sino-Soviet relations? Second, the estimate should be sure to explore the role that recent developments in US-Chinese and US-Soviet relations have played and are likely to play in the Chinese and Soviet calculus about their relations with one another.

The burden of the presentation made by the two NIO's responsible was that some change has taken place and is likely to continue. Though a radical shift in relations, e.g. reestablishing the pre-split commonality of purpose, is considered most unlikely, changes which in balance could be harmful to US interests are entirely possible.

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- N10/USM  
N10/EA  
Shun idea  
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useful.*
- o The MAP believes this is an important conclusion and warrants being stated sooner rather than later. (An SNIE rather than NIE? Or even an IIM anticipating this conclusion?)
  - o While it would be inappropriate for an IC product to be policy prescriptive, it seemed to the MAP not inappropriate to speculate upon how US actions might impact on this evolving Sino-Soviet relationship. Indeed this might be its most valuable contribution.
  - o While it may represent something of a departure, we believe that the IC should consider projecting one or two "less likely" developments, specifically toward a more rapid and more extensive rapprochement than is in fact believed probable. The value would be three-fold for the policymaker: first, it would alert him to think about the possibility that the most likely outcome may in fact turn out to be wrong, second, it would alert him as to what signs to look for that movement toward a more far reaching rapprochement is taking place and thirdly, it would provide him a basis for contingency planning. The IC does not do enough such speculative analysis thereby reducing its value to policymakers.

5. The Korean Military Balance. Though a well done and responsive approach to the question, i.e. how do North Korean and South Korean military forces stack up against one another, here was another example where the frame of reference was overly restrictive.

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As the paper points out, a key deterrent to North Korean attack remains the US commitment to defend South Korea. This raises two points not discussed in this paper, though perhaps treated--or to be treated--in other papers:

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Several other estimates are under preparation including one on the transition of leadership in the North and another on warning of attacks. The board feels key judgments of these papers could usefully be incorporated in NIE 42/14.

6. Soviet Perceptions of Chinese Nuclear Forces. In general the Panel was impressed that the NIO was approaching this issue in a useful way. (The paper has an early summer target for completion) and so is in a relatively early stage of preparation.) In general the Soviets appear to credit the PRC with a somewhat greater capability than does the US. The Panel did urge upon the NIO two points:

- o First, what do the Soviets believe would be the likely targets of PRC nuclear weapons? Are these likely to be counter-force, either battlefield or strategic, or counter-value?
- o Second, to the extent counter-value, what implications does this have not only for the Moscow ABM (which the NIO intends to cover) but for the application of the SA X-12 and for a Soviet impetus to broaden their BMD system (with the implications this has for the US-USSR ABM Treaty).

7. Whither the USSR: Soviet Politics/Policy - 1990's. The MAP was frankly uneasy over the nature of the discussion on this subject. This was not because we believed the NIO's were in any sense unintelligent in their approach to the problem but rather because of what we perceived as the potential for misunderstanding on the part of at least some key policymakers. Especially since the NIO's see the consumer of this estimate being in part the Hill, not only what is said but how it is said is of vital importance. With a new NIO this issue is underlined in importance. Since much is in the eye of the beholder, unless it is the intention to leave the impression that vast and fundamental changes are taking place under Gorbachev and that such changes may reduce problems which we face with the USSR, the estimate will have to be carefully couched to avoid such a judgment. We could not tell, from our exchanges for example, whether even if Gorbachev is successful in making major changes in the system (in itself problematical) this would result in a more cooperative US-Soviet relationship or alternatively face the US with a more effective competitor. No doubt these issues will clarify themselves as the estimate develops, but

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we believe it is of such profound potential importance in the message it conveys to senior Executive Branch policymakers as well as to interested members of Congress that this is an estimate which should receive careful and detailed scrutiny by you. (The MAP hopes to revisit the estimate as it moves into later stages.)

More specifically it was the MAP view that

- o Since the USSR is the makeweight in US policy--foreign policy, and to a lesser extent, domestic priorities--and
- o since the USSR remains preoccupied with military production/force structure, and with politico-military competition with the US, and
- o since Gorbachev's 56 years of age may assure him 10-15 years to execute his programs, and
- o since Gorbachev clearly has a 10+ year time horizon, the US needs a long-range estimate of Soviet policy options.

While such an estimate of necessity must deal with gross uncertainty, this is a case where the policymakers of the US deserve a probing anticipatory analysis, even where the evidence is scanty, or even non-existent. One way to handle the vast inherent uncertainties is for the estimate to offer alternative possibilities, assessing the likelihood as well as the policy related implication of each.

In particular, policymakers need to have a sensing of what Soviet external behavior might be over the next decade, even though it must be described in terms of alternative possibilities; especially with respect to:

- arms control
- peripheral security (e.g. SWA, NATO, NW Pacific)
- 3d World competition with the US
- fundamental geopolitical objectives

Finally, one of the MAP members raised the question of whether, when completed, this estimate should be considered for publication in a sanitized, unclassified form.

8. Soviet Economic Strains. In a sense this estimate cannot be separated from the preceding one and the self same issues, i.e. of what the Estimate wishes to convey and the form and language in which it is conveyed, apply. The Panel was not entirely convinced that the intended message was clear. How large an economic problem the Soviets face (there is not much of a statistical basis for making judgments), how far down the line in point of time they are likely to be confronted with whatever problems are perceived and finally what correctives are available to them seemed to the Panel the key points. Though we do not necessarily attribute this point of view to the analysts, the Panel felt that the impression of an economic crunch being inevitable might be derived. In this connection there seemed to be considerable emphasis on the potential magnitude of the problem (at some

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undefined point downstream) with the implied rejection that somehow the problem could be surmounted. For example, reliance on Western technology and loans was, by itself, rejected as being inadequate to meet the vast magnitude of the potential economic strains. Perhaps this is correct but the Panel wondered whether some combination of correctives, each inadequate by itself, might meet the need: external loans and technology, some modest restraint on consumer expansion, ditto on the military, some modest (2%) growth in the GNP, etc. It is this sort of analysis which we think is likely to be most useful to the policymakers. In any event, absent a more impressive statistical presentation or a key sector-by-sector analysis of the economy, the conception of Soviet economic strains takes on the tone of assertion rather than demonstration.

9. Soviet Military Production. The presentation was excellent; the conclusion in the minds of the Panel, not reassuring. Perhaps one of the most useful results of the Estimate, of which the analyst was properly proud, was that it has caused those in the IC holding divergent views to communicate with one another. Nevertheless, even though the degree of agreement among agencies may have been substantially increased, the degree of uncertainty in our data, even agreed data, is in many cases, vast. Troubling in and of itself, the policy implications need to be pointed up. If we really do not know how many ICBM's of a given type have been produced it becomes almost axiomatic that we cannot limit such ICBM's in an arms control agreement with any degree of confidence. Implications such as these need to be pointed up.

10. INF. Though not on our original agenda, the Panel had an excellent session on INF. Subject to precisely what you have already presented to State, Defense and the NSC on this subject, several issues caught the Panel's attention:

- o Is there an assessment as to how the Soviets see the resulting military balance, assuming a zero INF for Europe, 100 warhead in Asia, and the present availability of shorter range Soviet systems (not to mention large numbers of ICBM's to cover the targets)?
- o Are the Soviets trying to reduce the likelihood of use of theater nuclear systems preferring a conventional balance which US and NATO believes favors them?
- o Politically do the Soviets see the INF proposal as helping to decouple the US from its NATO allies?

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One possible conclusion which could be reached was that the Soviets may in fact not be sacrificing much by accepting the INF deal, militarily the West could come off poorly, politically the impact could be a divisive one in the

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West and from a verification point of view we may not have much in the way of assurance. To the extent this is true the policymakers should be made aware of these implications.

Two additional points warrant prompt attention:

- o Some analysts speculate the Soviets might propose such far reaching on-site verification that the US could not accept it, e.g. inspection of private US plants, on-board nuclear subs, etc. Although good arguments could be made that the Soviets could not risk our accepting such provision and thus would not offer them, the policymaker should not be denied the opportunity to contemplate the possibility.
- o The Soviets could conclude that the hook has been firmly imbedded and that the Administration must now conclude an agreement and thus the possibility is open for them to renege on apparent partial concessions they have already made. Again there is some precedence for this in the history of negotiating with the Russians which the IC might well usefully present for consideration by the policymakers.

11. As is always the case, an attempt has been made to reflect as accurately as possible the views of the Panel as a whole. However, the members have not had an opportunity to review all portions of this final memorandum.

Amb. Seymour Weiss  
Chairman, MAP

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